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AND AN UNEXPECTED IMPLICATION FOR CHILD LABOR:
HYPOTHESIS AND AN EMPIRICAL TEST
Kaushik Basu and Ranjan Ray
1. Introduction
The  'collective  model'  of the  household  assumes  that  a household  maximizes  a
weighted  average  of the  wife's  and  husband's  utilities,  where  the  weights  capture  each
agent's  'power'  or  effectiveness  in  the  decision-making  process.'  Hence,  unlike  in
Becker's (1981)  classic 'unitary model', any change  in a variable that changes the balance
of power in  the  household  can lead to changes  in  the household's  consumption  pattern,
even when the household's  total income and all prices remain unchanged.  There is a large
literature that tracks exactly  how changes  in the balance of power changes a household's
consumption.  Thus there are studies which show that greater  power to the woman results
in better clothing  for  the  children,  less  expenditure  on tobacco,  better nutrition  for the
children and  so  on.2 What has however been rarely  studied  is  the relation between  the
balance of power in the household and the incidence of child labor.3
The present paper is focussed entirely on this relation.  First, a theoretical model is
developed  to  show that the balance  of power in the household  impacts  on child  labor in
unexpected ways. It is argued  that as the woman's power increases,  child labor will first
fall  and then  rise.  The hypothesis  is the result  of an interesting  theoretical process.  It is
'See  Chiappori,  1988; Browning and Meghir,  1991;  Bourguignon  and Chiappori,  1994; Browning,
Bourguignon, Chiappori,  and Lechene,  1994.
2Lundberg,  Pollak and Wales,  1997; Kanbur and Haddad,  1994.
3Moehling  (1995), Iversen (2001), Emerson and Portela (2001), and Basu (2001)  constitute virtually the
totality of the literature  on this.
2formally  derived  in Section  2.  In  Section  3 the hypothesis  is  empirically  tested  using
household data from Nepal.  The data yield robust corroboration of the hypothesis.
These findings  have important policy implications.  They suggest that a household
in which power is well balanced  between  the husband and the wife  is least likely to send
the children to  work.  In other words,  if we  are interested  in curbing  child labor and are
dealing  with a traditional  society where  women have  very little power, we  should  try to
empower women.  However,  our study also suggests that this relation is not monotonic.  In
other  words,  if we  give too  much power  to the women,  we can get a negative  backlash
with  child  labor  rising  once  again.  Section  4  comments  on  these  and  other  policy
implications.
2. Theory
Consider  a household  consisting  of a  wife (agent  1),  a husband  (agent  2)  and a
child  (agent  3).  There  are  n goods  in  this  economy.  Let  ui  :  9I'  -*  91,  i  =  1,2,  be the
utility  function of agent  i.  The  collective  model  claims  that the household  maximizes  a
weighted average  of the utility functions of the two adults:
Q  0u 1 (x) + (l-0)u2(x),  (1)
where 0  E [0,1 ] captures the balance of power in the household. As 0 increases the wife's
power increases.
In order to study the effect of the household's  power structure  on child labor,  all
we  have  to do  is to admit child  leisure  as  one  of the goods  in the  vector  x. Then  if we
define  child  labor as 1 rminus child leisure, the household's  optimization will yield results
on how much the child will be made to work.
3To keep the analysis simple,  we will assume that there are three  goods - good 1,
good  2 and  child leisure.  We  will  use  e3 to denote  the  amount of work the  child  does.
Hence  1 - e3  is child leisure. In this theoretical section, we  will consider only the child's
effort (assuming that the adults always  work). Therefore,  there should be no confusion in
writing  e  for e3. Hence, the  utility functions of the wife and the husband may be written
as:
ul =ul (xI, x2, l-e)
U2  = u2(xI,  X2,  l-e).
The  two  substantial  assumptions  that  we  would  like  to  maintain  are  (A)  the
husband and the wife have different  preferences over the two goods  1 and 2  and (B)  both
of them find it painful to send their children to work.
Our main hypothesis, to wit, that as 0 rises, e will first fall and then rise, is largely
a direct consequence  of assumptions (A)  and (B) (as we show below).  Hence,  in a sense
our empirical test could  be thought of as  a test of the  collective model of the household
along with the restrictions that come with assumptions  (A) and (B).
Let  us  first  explain  the  hypothesis  intuitively,  before  turning  to  the  formal
derivation.
Since  both husband  and  wife  consider  it painful  to  send the  child  to work  the
household's  evaluation of the  cost of child  labor remains  unchanged  no matter what the
value  of 0. This  is  simply  another  way of saying that the weighted  average  of the  same
1
value  is  unaffected  by  changes  in  the  weights.  Next  note  that  if 0  is  2 ,  the  goods
purchased by the household will not be ideal for either the man or the wife.  Hence, if 0 is
4-,  and the child is  sent out to work,  the benefit  of the  goods bought  by the additional
income will benefit neither adult  too much.  Orn the other hand, if 0 = 1, the woman being
the  sole  decision-maker  in  the  household  will  direct  the  additional  money  earned  by
sending  the  child  to  work  to  purchase  exactly  the  goods  she  finds  valuable.  Hence,
sending the child  to work would now seem  more worthwhile.  The  same  logic with  the
man being the sole decision-maker would hold  if 0 = 0.  Hence if 0 takes extreme  values,
the household will be more prone to make the child work.4
A  simple  model  to  formalize  this  idea  may be  specified  as  follows.  We  shall
assume that there are two goods, 1 and 2, and the two adults, the woman (agent 1) and the
man (agent 2), differ in their attitude  towards the two goods. Agent 1 tends to like good 1
more.  With e denoting the amount of work done by the child, let c(e) be the cost of work
to the child, where  c'(e):> 0, c"(e) > 0, for all e.  We will assume,  as explained  above, that
both parents  feel the child's pain of labor.  We capture  these  assumptions  in a somewhat
stylized manner by assuming that agents I and 2 have the following utility functions:
ul = min{xl, ax2}  - c(e)
u2 = min{ax,, x2}  - c(e)
where  a >  1. If we hold e constant  and draw  the indifference  curves of the two agents in
the goods space,  xi  being the amount  of good  i consumed by the household,  we have  a
4 We do not want to claim that our assumptions are beyond reproach.  It is,  for instance, possible to argue
that, while both parents find child labor painful, they differ about what the child should do with the time
saved by not working-one  nay want the child to stuay,  the other to play.  This could dilute the zest of the
5picture  as in Figure  1. II and  I2  denote indifference  curves of,  respectively,  the woman
and the man. If they both face the same budget constraint,  for instance, the one shown on
line AB in Figure  1, the woman would prefer to consume more of good 1. If
a =  1  their relative preferences converge.
Assuming  that the price of both goods  is  1 and child wage  is w,  the household's
problem (using (1)  above) is to maximize
Q = 0 min{x1, ax2} + (1-0)min{axi,  x2} - c(e)  (2)
subject to xi + x2< ew + w  (3)
where  w  is the total income from non-child-labor  sources.
The main hypothesis that this paper sets out to test empirically  is an  outcome of
solving the above maximization  problem of the household.  The result is here  stated as  a
theorem and given a formal proof.
In  stating and proving the Theorem  let us  denote the  solution to the  household's
maximization  problem as:
x,  =x (O, w, w)
X 2 =x 2 (9,w,w)
e  =e(O,  w, w) .
Theorem 1:  Starting  from 0  = 0,  as  0  rises  the  amount of child labor  (i.e.  e) initially
falls and then rises.
parents from keeping the child from work. Our hunch is that  this difference will not be big enough to alter
our hypothesis.  In any case, one way to view the empirical test is as a test of this hunch.
6Proof.  First note that the following inequalities must always hold:
ax2 2 x,  (4)
and  ax 1 -X 2 (5)
To  prove  this,  note first  that  both  (4)  and  (5)  cannot  be  false,  since  a >  1. So,
without loss of generality, assume (4) is violated. Then, given a >  1, it follows that
ax, > X;  (6)
Hence (2) reduces to:
Q =  0 a  x2 +  (l  - O)x2 -c(e).
Since (4) is false  and (6)  true,  it is  possible to raise  x2  and lower  x,  while holding total
household  expenditure  constant.  Since  this raises Q we have a contradiction.  This proves
that (4) and (5)  must always hold. Hence  (2) may be written as:
Q = B xi + (l - )X2 - c(e)
or further, by using (3), as:
Q =  Ox, + (1-O)(e-w+ w-x,j)  -c(e)  (7)
The household's  aim is to maximize  this by choosing xi and e.
From (7)  it is easy to see that if 0>  1-0, or
0>1/2,  (8)
then  the  household  will  set xi  as  large  as possible,  to wit,  xi  =  a  x2,  since  we already
know that, if the budget constraint is given by AB in Figure  1, the household will always
A  A  A
remain within line  segment between points  a  and  b; and  that at point  a, x,  = ax2 . This
coupled with the budget constraint (3),  gives uls
7a 
x, =-  (ew+w).
l+a
Inserting this in (7) yields
Q) = O a (e  +  ) + (1-  ) (ew  )_- c(e)  (9)
I+a  l+a
Differentiating this with respect to e and setting it equal to zero, gives us the first-
order condition:
1  w  a  - 10)+ 
1+a 
Next consider the case where  (8) is violated,  that is O <  1/2. Then the household
A
will set xi as small as possible (i.e. at point b  in Figure  1). Hence  ax, =  X2,  which, along
with (3), imply  x,  = (ew + w) /(1  + a).  Inserting this in (8), we get
0 (ew +  w)  (  )a(ew  + w)
l+a  l+a
And from the first-order condition we obtain
w(l - a)  + aw = c'(e)  (11)
l+a
Since c"(e) > 0, these first-order conditions automatically satisfy the second-order
conditions.
From (11) it is obvious that as 0 rises, e must fall, since  1 < a and c"(e) > 0.  Hence
starting  from 0  =  0,  up  to  0  =  1/2,  child  labor  falls  as  0  rises.  Beyond  1/2,  as  0  rises
further, (10) becomes the relevant condition and so child labor will begin to rise.  l l
Hence, what the theorem has shown is that the response of child labor to the index
of power of the wife looks  as in Figure  2.  If the  parameters  were  exactly  as specified
8above  the figure  would  have been  a perfect  U. But  in this  case  we illustrate  a slightly
distorted case, as explained below.
Before  venturing  to  empirical  investigation,  it should  be  clarified  that there  are
other kinds  of relations  that can with  a little ingenuity,  be  generated  theoretically.  By
introducing  a sharply diminishing  marginal  utility, the  U-shaped relation can be altered.
Some other possible  relations  are explored  in Basu (2001).  This  is exactly what makes
empirical work important in an area like this.
On the basis  of some  very  plausible  assumptions  we have  here  established  the
U-shaped relation.  The assumptions  we need are  essentially that both parents  are united
about child  labor being  undesirable  but they  disagree  on what  is the  ideal consumption
basket  for  the  household.  The  rest of the  many assumptions  we made  were  purely  for
expositional convenience.
The  exact U-shape,  symmetric  around  V*=  12  is of course  a consequence  of the
specific algebraic  assumptions that we made. Also,  in reality, the parents may have some
difference  of opinion about the cost of child labor. It could be that the  mother considers
this more costly than the father or vice versa.  In such cases the U-shape can acquire some
distortion, such as becoming,  respectively,  --shaped (tau-shaped)  or J-shaped.  In fact the
case illustrated in Figure 2 is one where the above result is distorted by adding the feature
that that mother finds child labor more painful than the father.  Hence, at *  - 0 child labor
is higher than when  1.
93. Data and Results
The  data on child  labor comes  from the Nepal  Living Standards  Survey (NLSS)
conducted in June,  1995 by the Household  Survey Unit of the Central Bureau of Statistics
(CBS).  The  latter  (i.e.  CBS)  is  under  the  National  Planning  Commission.  The  main
objective  of  the  NLSS  is  to  collect  data  from  Nepalese  households  and  provide
information  to the  government  to monitor progress  in national  living  standards  and  to
evaluate  the  impact  of various  policies  and  programs  on  the  living  conditions  of the
population.  The  NLSS  differs  from  other  surveys  that  have  been  done  in  Nepal  in
gathering  information  on a variety  of areas rather  than focussing  only on one  area.  The
sample size for the  NLSS  is 3388  households.  Further,  this  sample  is divided  into four
strata based on the Geographic  regions of the country:  mountains, urban hills, rural hills
and the  terai. The questionnaire  for the NLSS  collected  information  at three  levels:  the
household  level,  the  individual  level  and  information  on  specific  items  such  as  food
items, land plots and type of crops.
Table 1 presents the sample means, along with standard errors, of some of the key
variables  of interest  in  our study.  To  get a sense of where  Nepal  stands vis-a-vis  other
developing nations,  note that the average number of children in a Nepalese  household is
somewhat  lower than the  comparable  sample means  in the data  sets of Peru (3.84)  and
Pakistan (5.61)  reported in Ray (2000,  Table  3). Moreover,  the gender  balance  between
the number  of boys and girls in the household is much more even than that reported  for
Peru and  Pakistan.  On average,  the most educated  female  member  enjoys less  than half
the  educational  experience  of the most educated male  member of the household.  While
the ratio of child labor hours to that of the adult male in Nepal (0.19) is somewhat higher
10than  that  reported  for  Peru  (0.12)  and  Pakistan  (0.13)  in  Ray  (2000,  Table  3),  the
corresponding  ratio of child labor hours to female labor hours in Nepal (0.24)  is identical
to that  in  Peru, but a good  deal lower than that  in Pakistan  (0.60).  The  information on
daily wages shows that a mild gender disparity in child wages  in favor of girls is sharply
reversed in adults (16-55 years) with the gap narrowing somewhat in the older age groups
(56+).
To  put the theory to  test, we  need  to  locate  a  suitable  variable that  determines
female  bargaining  or  the  amount  of say  that  the  female  has  in  household  decision-
making.  The detenninants of power are many but it seems reasonable  to suppose that the
more  educated  a  woman  is  the more  power  she  will  have  or, the  greater  the  income
contribution  she  makes  to  the  household,  the  more  say  she  will  have  in  household
decision-making.  Accordingly,  this  study uses,  as a measure  of the  female's  bargaining
power in the household, the ratio (0) of the educational experience  (in years of schooling)
of the most educated  adult female  member to the  sum of the educational  experiences  of
the most educated adult male and adult female members of that household. The empirical
exercise,  subsequently,  establishes  robustness  of  the  qualitative  impact  of  female
bargaining power on  chiild  labor hours by using an alternative  measure for  such power,
A~~~~~~~~~ namely,  the  share  (9)  of adult female  earnings  in total  aduilt (i.e.  non child)  earnings.
Table 2 compares  the sample means  of 0,  9  and of some  other key indicators  between
households with and without working children.  The following points are worth noting:  (i)
the female's  share  of the  household's  educational  experience  (0) is considerably  lower
A
than her share of adult earnings  (9), and (ii)  the sharp  fall in the ratio of rural to urbanhouseholds  from those with working children to those without suggests  that the majority
of Nepalese child laborers are in the rural areas.
Table 3 provides information  on the share (at sample mean)  of adult female, adult
male  and  child  earnings  in  total  household's  earnings,  and  on  how  these  shares  vary
between households with and without working children. The share of child labor earnings
in total household  earnings  in Nepal  (5.6%) is nontrivial  and  is very close to the figure
(5.9%) reported for Pakistan  and much higher than that for Peru (1.6%) reported in Ray
(2000,  Table  4).  Note  that  in  the  subsample  of  Nepalese  households  with  working
children,  the share of child earnings rises to over 20%.
Let us now turn to the estimates. In the following discussion, we refer to el,  e2,  e3
as  the aggregate  labor hours  worked,  respectively,  by  adult  females,  adult  males  and
children  (0-15  years),  and  w1,  W 2,  W 3 are  the  corresponding  daily  wage  rates.  The
empirical  exercise  centers  around  the  estimation  of  child  labor  hours  (e3)  under
alternative  specifications. The basic child labor hours equation is specified as follows:
e3h =  PO + Pl1h +  P2 O  + P3(tPC)h +  P4 n3h +  15 n4h +  P6W3h  + Ulh  (12)
where h  denotes  household,  n3,  n4  denote,  respectively,  the  number of children  in age
groups  10-15 years  and less than 10 years; tpc  is the total per capita consumption.  Note
that tpc  is  used  as  a proxy  for non child  household  income  in the  absence  of reliable
income information. Note, also, that  as the estimated coefficients  for ni  (number of adult
females)  and n2 (number of adult males) turned out to be insignificant, they were omitted
in the estimations reported below.
The alternative specifications for the estimation of (12) are as follows.
(A)  OLS estimation of (12).
(B)  Estimation of (12) with Heckman correction for sample selection.
12(C)  Instrumental  'Variable  Estimation  (IVE)  of  (12)  with  tpc  regarded  as  an
endogenous  regressor,  and  instrumented  by a set of variables.  The IVs used are:
non  child  (i.e.  adult)  earnings,  (adult  earnings)2 ,  development  region  (DR,
measured  as  a  qualitative  variable),  rural/urban  (RUR,  measured  as  a  dummy
which  takes  the value  1 if household  is  rural,  0  if it is urban),  n1 (no.  of adult
males), n2 (no. of adult females).
(D)  Simultaneous  Equation  Estimation,  using  3  SLS,  of  a  5  equation  system
consisting  of (:12)  and the following 4 equations.  (note:  The household  subscript,
h, has been omitted for clarity)
ei = yo + ylw! + y2w2 + y3N  + y4 tpc + y5s  + 7602 + U2 (13)
e2  = CEO + a  wl  +  CE 2w2 + a-,N +  a 4tpc  +  a 50 + C(602 +  u 3 (14)
tpc = 8o + 81DR + 82RUR + 83n1  + 84n2 + 85n3
(15)
+ 8611 4 + 67WI  + 88W 2 + 89W 3 + U4
0 =  -o + E1DR+ G2RUR+  E3nI  + E4n2 +  E5n3
(16)
+  E6114 +  E7W 1 + E8 W 2 + E9W 3 + U5
where N (=nj + n2 + n3 + n4) denotes the total number of household members, and
(u2,  U3,  U4,  U5)  are  the  stochastic  error  terms.  The  3  SLS  procedure,  used  in
estimating  (D) [i.e.  equations (12) - (16)], besides recognizing  the endogeneity of
0,  tpc,  also,  allows  mutual  feedback  between equations  (12)  - (16)  through the
non diagonal  (5  x  5) variance  matrix  of the  estimated  errors  of the  5  equation
system.  As  already  noted,  we  investigate  the  sensitivity  of our  results  to  the
variable used to measure the female's bargaining power by re-estimating  (D) with
0 replaced by  0 ( = wjej/(wiei  + w2e2)) in the equations.
Since  the focus  of this paper  is on  e3  [equation (12)],  we report, in case  of (D),
only the 3 SLS  estimates  of equation  (12),  while  those of equations (13)  - (16) will be
made  available  on  request.  Table  4 presents  the  estimates  of equation  (12)  under  the
alternative  specifications  (A) - (D). In addition, the table also reports the 3  SLS estimates
of equation (12) in the 5 equations  system [equations  (12) - (16)],  with 0 being replaced
A
by  9  as a measure  of female  power.  The  latter  is  referred  to  as  specification  E.  Note,
13incidentally, that the tables report robust standard errors correcting  for an unknown form
of heteroskedasticity.  We,  also,  estimated  a tobit  regression  model of the  child  labor
hours, e3 [equation (12)].  The coefficient  (left censored)  estimates and standard errors of
this model, referred to as specification  F, are presented in Table 5.  In this paper, we have
defined  an  'adult'  as  an  individual  aged  16  years  and  above.  However,  to  examine
robustness  of our  principal  empirical  results  to  the  definition  of an  'adult',  in  the
Heckman  and 3SLS estimates reported in Table 4 (ie.,  specifications  B, D), an 'adult'  is
defined to be an individual aged 20 years and above.
The following conclusions emerge from Tables 4, 5.
(i)  The  magnitudes  of  the  estimated  coefficients  are  fairly  sensitive  to  the
specification.  However,  the  direction  of impact,  i.e. the  sign of the  estimate,  is
generally  quite robust.  For example,  the child wage rate  (W 3)  and the number of
girls,  boys  in the household  (n3,  n)  have  significantly  positive  impact on  child
labor  hours.  Similarly,  rising  household  affluence  (as  measured  by  tpc)  either
significantly reduces  child labor hours  (as in specifications  A,  C, E, F)  or has  no
significant impact (as in specifications  B, D).
(ii)  Of  particular  interest  in  this  study,  are  the  estimated  coefficients  of  0,  02
A  A
(specifications  A-D,  F) and of 9,9 2  (specification  E). Tables 4 & 5 confirm that,
A
while  the magnitudes  vary, the  estimate  of the linear coefficient  (i.e.  of 0,  9)  is
negative  and highly  significant  and  that  of the  quadratic  coefficient  (i.e. of 02,
A
0  2)  is  positive  and  highly  significant  in most cases.  The  IV  estimates  of 0,  02
(specification  C), which are both statistically insignificant,  are the main exception.
In  other  words,  conditional  on  the  other  household  characteristics  remaining
A
unchanged,  the  relationship  between  e3  and  0  (or  9)  is  U  shaped  (or,  more
precisely,  tau-shaped)  exactly as predicted in the previous  section. It is important
to note that this U shaped relationship is quite robust to specification.
A
(iii)  To throw further light on the impact of female's bargaining power (0, 9) on child
labor  hours,  we  plot  the  graphical  relationship  between  the  two  under  the
alternative  specifications  (A) - (F),  with the other variables  held constant  at the
sample means.  The  graphs,  presented  in Figs.  3(a) - 3(f),  all confirm that as we
A
move  from  a state of negligible  female power  (i.e.  0,  9  - 0)  to one where  it  is
A
nearly  absolute  (i.e.  0,  0  - 1),  child  labor  hours  (e3)  initially  decline but,  then,
14increase,  as  women  begin  to  dominate  men  in  terms  of  their  educational
experience or their labor earnings.
(iv)  These graphs,  also,  largely agree on another  interesting finding.  While the initial
A  A
decline in e3, with increasing 0 (or  9).,  is reversed beyond a critical 0 (or  9), the
A
value of e3  at 0 = 0  = I is less than that at 0 =  9  = 0. In other words, child labor
A
hours, when male power is  fully dominant (0  = 9  = 0), exceed that when  female
A
power dominates completely  (0  =  9  =  1). In other words, the  incidence of child
labor as a function of female power is i:-shaped.
In  closing  we  should  mention  that  in  this  study  we  have  made  no  effort  to
distinguish  between male  and  female  child labor.  From  the piecemeal  evidence  that  is
available  on  this  we  know  that  the  gender  of the  child  makes  a  difference;  that the
incidence  of girl and boy labor can be very different and they may respond  to different
variables.  However,  our theoretical  analysis suggests  that even if the incidence  of male
and  female  child  labor  happens  to be  different,  each  one's response  to  changes  in the
structure  of power  in the household  should be  the same  in the  sense of both being tau-
shaped.  Nevertheless,  this  is  a  subject  of interest  and  deserving  of future  empirical
investigation.
4. Policy
As awareness  of the  enormous problem of child labor worldwide has  increased,
there  has occurred  a rise in research  trying  to  identify  the determinants  of child  labor.
This research has the value of informing policymakers  how best to mitigate the problem
of child  labor.  While  studies  have  isolated  factors  such  as  parental  income,  parental
education,  school  quality, incentives  given for attending  school,  credit availability  (see,
for instance,  Basu and Van,  1998;  Basu,  1999;  Ravallion  and Wodon,  2000; Ray,  2000;
15Baland  and Robinson,  2000),  there have been very  few studies  on the relation between
the balance of power in the household between the husband and the wife and its impact
on child labor.
The results derived in this paper show that from the point of view of child labor it
is best to have households  where power  is evenly balanced, that is, neither the man (and,
more surprisingly) nor the woman should have a disproportionate  amount of power.
While  previous  studies  have  shown  that higher parental  education  makes  child
labor less likely, our study shows that there are greater  subtleties involved in this relation.
While  it may be  better,  ceteris  paribus,  to  have more-educated  adults, the  incidence  of
child labor is kept at its lowest by achieving  a more balanced  level of education  among
the  parents.  Since  most  developing  countries  are characterized  by  a  disproportionately
low level of education  and literacy among  women, our study provides  additional  reason
why female education  ought to be emphasized in developing countries.
16Table 1: Selected  Household  Characteristics in Nepal (Sample Mean)
Characteristic  Sample Mean(a)
Number of children in the household  2.70
(2.08)
Ratio of girls to boys  0.97
(1.12)
Ratio of the most educated woman's educational  experience to  0.46
that of the most educated man in the household(')  (0.62)
Daily Child Wages of Girls (10 - 15 years)  Rs.  44.32
(38.33)
Daily Child Wages of Boys (10 - 15 years)  Rs.  38.70
(24.06)
Daily Adult Wages of Females (16 - 55 years)  Rs. 51.35
(47.71)
Daily Adult Wages of Males (16 - 55 years)  Rs. 86.42
(71.99)
Daily Adult Wages of Elderly Females (56 years +)  Rs. 51.46
(65.04)
Daily Adult Wages of Elderly Males (56 years +)  Rs.  61.31
(48.32)
Ratio of child labor hours to adult female labor hours  0.24
(0.57)
Ratio of child labor hours to adult male labor hours  0.19
(0.41)
Rural (=1) or Urban Household (=0)  0.79
(0.41)
a Figures in parentheses denote standard deviations.
bMeasured  in years of schooling.
17Table 2: Comparison of Selected  Household  Characteristics Between  Households
With and Without Working Children
Sample Mean(a)
Characteristic  Households  with  Households  without
Working Children  Working Children
(e3  > °)  (e3  = 0)
Woman's Share of Educational  0.40  0.39
Experience (0)  (.31)  (0.32)
Woman's Share of Earnings  (0)  0.27  0.29
(0.29)  (0.29)
Percentage of Total Consumption  0.0228  0.0289
Spending on Education  (.043)  (.053)
No. of Adult Women (16  years and  2.89  2.64
above)  (1.81)  (1.67)
No. of Adult Men (16 years and  3.02  2.71
above)  (2.10)  (1.89)
No. of Girls (0 - 15 years)  1.91  0.51
(1.44)  (0.80)
No. of Boys (0-  15 years)  2.04  1.70
(1.76)  (1.56)
Rural (=1) or Urban (=0) Household  0.87  0.75
(0.33)  (0.43)
Adult Earnings  Rs.  12.13  Rs. 21.94
(11.80)  (22.41)
aFigures in parentheses denote standard deviations.
18Table 3:  Shares of Household Earnings in Nepal
Sample Meana
Households with  Households
Household Member  Working  Without Working  All
Children  Children  Households
(e3 > O)  (e3  = O)
Woman's Share  0.331  0.389  0.374
(.207)  (.316)  (.292)
Man's Share  0.458  0.611  0.570
(.251)  (.316)  (.308)
Child's Share  0.211  .056
(0.165)  (.126)
'Figures  in parentheses denote standard deviations.
19Table 4: Estimates of Child Labor Hours Under Alternative Specificationsa
Coefficient  Estimate  Coefficient
Estimate
Variable  OLS  Heckman  IVb  3 SLSc  Variable  3 SLSd
(A)  Correction  Estimation  Estimation  Estimation
(B)  (C)  (D)  (E)
Female's  Share  -0.145e  -1.73e-7e  -0.054  -0.974e  Female's Share  -0.278e
of Adult  (.061)  (3.35e-8)  (.069)  (.480)  of Adult  (.110)
Education (0)  Earnings  (0)
02  0.145'  l.19e-7e  0.055  1.041  A  2  0.207e
(.067)  (3.40e-8)  (.073)  (.559)  0  (.100)
Total per  -9.2le-7e  -2.79e-13  -4.26e-6e  7.98e-7  tpc  -8.59e-6e
capita con-  (4.66e-7)  (1.73e-13)  (1.45e-6)  (3.56e-6)  (1.47e-6)
sumption (tpc)
No. of Girls  .109'  .1  14e  .108e  .130e  n3  0.130e
(n3)  (.021)  (0.017)  (.021)  (.007)  (.007)
No. of Boys  .019e  .01le  .014e  .021e  n4  .016e
(n4)  (.007)  (.005)  (.007)  (.005)  (.004)
Child Wage  .013e  .015e  .013e  .014e  W3  .014e
Rate (W 3)  (.002)  (.001)  (.002)  (.0004)  (.0004)
Constant  -.029  -.022  .002  -.025  Constant  .071
(.021)  (.013)  (025)  (.023)  (.030)
aRobust Standard Errors in parentheses.
bHausman  Test  for  Ho:  Difference  between  OLSE  (Specification  A)  and  IVE  (Specification  C)  is  not
systematic  is:  X52  = .08  i.e.  Ho is not rejected.  See text for a list of the instruments used.
cBreusch  Pagan  Test for Ho:  Variance  Matrix  for Specification  D  is diagonal  is  X2  = 246.332  i.e.  Ho  is
rejected.
dBreusch  Pagan Test  for Ho:  Variance  Matrix  for Specification  E  is diagonal  is  X2  = 923.1 16  i.e.  Ho  is
rejected.
eStatistically  significant  at 5% level.
20Table 5: Tobit Estirnatesa  of C!iUd Labor Hours (Specification  F)
Variable  Coefficient Estimate




Total Per Capita Consumption (tpc)  -.00003 Ib
(6.68e-6)
No. of girls (n3)  0.405b
(.032)
No. of boys (n4)  .027
(.015)




aStandard Errors  in Parentheses.
bStatistically  significant at 5%  level.
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Figure 3(b). Heckman  Model










0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
Female Power (0)
* Child labor is measured in standard days. Other variables  in each regression were held fixed at their mean value.
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Note that the coefficients  of 0,02 are both statistically  insignificant  [see Table  4].  Since the  coefficients  in
the other  models are  significant,  the  insignificance  here  may  indicate  that the instruments  are  not the most
appropriate.
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